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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Cross-appeal, plaintiff/respondent presents the 
questions of whether an award of prejudgment interest is proper, 
and whether plaintiff should have been awarded its costs 
incurred in obtaining a trial transcript. 
The District Court was correct in its refusal to award 
prejudgment interest. The damages awarded in this tort action 
are not calculable with mathematical accuracy, and therefore an 
award of prejudgment interest is not proper. Even if such an 
award were proper in this type of case, plaintiff's conduct in 
causing or agreeing to a substantial number of the delays in 
this protracted case precludes such an award under the cir-
cumstances of this case. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to the cost of a trial transcript 
necessary for its appeal, because plaintiff failed to timely 
file a bill of costs with the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT AN 
AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS IMPROPER. 
A. Preiudcrment Interest is Not Allowed Where Damages 
Cannot be Calculated With Mathematical Accuracy, 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that prejudgment interest 
is allowable only where (1) the damage is complete; (2) the 
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time; and (3) the 
loss can be measured by facts and figures. Biork v. April 
Indus. , 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 
(1977). In the present case, damages could not have been 
calculated with mathematical accuracy. Moreover, the damage was 
not complete and loss was not fixed as of a particular time. 
Therefore, an award of prejudgment interest is not proper. 
In its brief, plaintiff points out at page 10 that lost 
rental income was a measure of damages considered by the jury. 
(See instruction no. 24, at R. 638.) The damage cannot be 
complete and the loss cannot be fixed at a particular time when 
the damage and loss are based upon lost rental income and lost 
shop space. Rental income fluctuates greatly depending on 
market value of rental space and occupancy rates. 
Even when damages are complete and the amount of loss is 
fixed as of a particular time, an award of prejudgment interest 
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is not allowed where the damages cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy. Joraensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 
229, 233 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 
583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978); Biork at 317. 
The Biork court listed examples of the types of cases in 
which prejudgment interest would clearly be improper. Such 
cases include "personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc . . . ." Biork at 317. The 
instant case, a tort action for negligent misrepresentation, is 
similar in nature to the cases listed in Bi ork.l These cases 
were provided as illustrations of the most obvious instances in 
which prejudgment would be improper; they were not meant as an 
exclusive list. The significant element with respect to the 
propriety of an award of prejudgment interest is, as recognized 
by Biork, whether the damages must be ascertained by the trier 
of fact and are arrived at by a process of measurement or 
computation which relied upon opinion or discretion. 
In valuation cases, the test is whether the value can be 
established by reference to well-established market values. See 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 659 (1988) . For example, in Jorcrensen 
v. John Clay and Co. , 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983), the Court 
affirmed an award of prejudgment interest on the damages 
incurred when the defendant breached a contract to purchase 
xIn the instant case, for example, as in the types of cases 
listed in Biork, a determining factor which was not subject to 
prior determination was the percentage of negligence attributed 
to each of the parties. 
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certain sheep. It is evident from the opinion that there 
existed a well-established market from which the price of sheep 
on a given day could be determined. 
Plaintiff cites to the 1907 case of Fell v. Union Pac. Ry., 
32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907) to demonstrate a modern trend 
toward an award of prejudgment interest in recognition of modern 
commercial life. An examination of much more recent cases, 
however, reveals that the courts of this state consistently 
award prejudgment interest only in cases where damages are 
liquidated or readily calculable with mathematical accuracy. 
See, e.g. , Fitzgerald v. Chritchfield, 744 P. 2d 301 (Utah App. 
1987) (sum certain due on oral contract) ; Golden Key Realty v. 
Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985) (liquidated damages on accord 
and satisfaction of exclusive real estate listing agreement); 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983) (reimbursement of excessive water fees); Bennion v. 
State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983) 
(mineral royalties owed). In each of these cases damages were 
readily calculable with mathematical accuracy, even though the 
amounts were sometimes disputed. 
On page 17 of its brief, plaintiff cites to what it claims 
is a factually similar case, that of Anderson v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty, 583 P.2d 101 (Utah 1978). Plaintiff's reliance on 
Anderson is unfounded since the facts of the Anderson case are 
easily distinguishable from the present case. Anderson was an 
action by an insured individual against the insurer under a 
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theft policy to recover for personal property having a replace-
ment value of $4,390.40, which was lost in a residential 
burglary. Id. at 101-02. The Anderson Court correctly held 
that the value of stolen property could be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy. 
In contrast, it has been held that the type of damages in 
the present case cannot be calculated with mathematical ac-
curacy. Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Wyo. 1984). In 
Bauer, a case cited by the trial court in denying prejudgment 
interest, a group of homeowners sued the developer of their 
subdivision to recover damages to their property. In deciding 
the issue of damages, the court, speaking of fair market value 
and diminution of value estimates, "recognized that those kinds 
of damages cannot be determined with mathematical precision 
[and] that they may be inherently uncertain . . . ." Id. at 
1325. Further, the court stated: 
The greatest difficulty in stating a general 
rule for recovery of damages has been in 
those cases involving damage to realty. 22 
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 13 5. So much is 
subjective and uncertain in determining fair 
market values before and after the damage, 
diminished values, whether the damage is 
permanent or temporary, the nature and 
extent of the damage and methods of repair. 
Id. at 1323-24. 
The trial court in the present case, which observed the 
testimony of damage calculation, was correct in determining that 
those damages were not calculable with mathematical accuracy. 
An award of prejudgment interest is improper. 
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B. Plaintiff's Conduct Precludes an Award of Prejudgment 
Interest. 
Even if the damages in the present case were calculable 
with mathematical accuracy, plaintiff's conduct precludes an 
award of prejudgment interest. In the case of Nelson v, 
Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), defendant purchasers of real 
property cross-appealed urging that the trial court erred in 
failing to award them prejudgment interest on their damages 
award. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
Even assuming that interest may be awarded 
in cases such as this, Droubay's conduct 
precludes an award of interest. The trial 
court stated, ". . .a substantial number of 
the delays, in this long-pending case were 
at the instance of or agreed to by the 
defendants." 
Id. at 1297. 
In Nelson, since the Droubays had occasioned or agreed to a 
substantial number of the delays in the eleven-year legal 
proceedings, they were not entitled to prejudgment interest. 
"Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as 
damages due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the 
amount owing under an obligation." L & A Drywall, Inc. v 
Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). When the 
lengthy delays in a case are due in part to the party seeking 
interest, an award of prejudgment interest would be tantamount 
to compensating a party for damages which that very party 
caused. This would violate basic principles of equity, hence, 
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Droubays were awarded no prejudgment interest. The same 
circumstances exist in the present case. 
The present action was commenced some fourteen years ago. 
Defendant does not presume to allege that plaintiff is solely 
responsible for all of the delays in this case, however, 
plaintiff has caused or agreed to a substantial number of the 
delays, so much so that defendant twice moved to dismiss the 
case for failure to prosecute. An examination of the chronology 
of the case reveals the extent to which plaintiff's acts and 
failure to act resulted in adding years to the duration of the 
present case. The following abbreviated chronology includes all 
the items listed in defendants memorandum in support of its 
second motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute (R. 413), as 
well as all the additional items included in plaintiffs memoran-
dum in opposition to that motion (R. 419). 
1. September 1974 - plaintiff's complaint is filed, based 
on events occurring in July of 1973. 
2. September 1974 - plaintiff moves for appointment of 
receiver and is denied. Thereafter defendant's answer 
is filed. 
3. July 1977 - 3 years later plaintiff files an amended 
complaint and, at the same time, requests a trial 
date. Defendant objects to the trial date since 
discovery is not complete. 
4. August 1977 - pretrial conference is scheduled and 
held in September. The conference was continued for 1 
7 
month, then the proceedings were stricken and never 
rescheduled. The last file entry for almost 3 years 
was for an indefinite postponement of the pretrial 
conference, filed in November 1977. 
Other than a small number of discovery proceedings, on 
the part of the defendant, in January and May of 1978, 
an additional 2\ years elapsed before plaintiff again 
pursued action by filing a request for trial setting 
in March 1980. 
May 1980 - defendant moves to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute (R. 152). The motion is denied without 
comment in a minute entry filed in June 1980 (R. 165). 
July 1980 - trial is held. Defendant's motion for new 
trial is granted. 
July 1981 - one year later, plaintiff requests a new 
trial setting. A new date is not set, and plaintiff 
again requests a date in October. Trial is set for 
June of 1982. 
On plaintiff's motion, trial is rescheduled for 
February 1983, some 8 months later. 
February 1983 - defendant amends its answer and 
alleges plaintiff has failed to join an indispensible 
party. The trial judge agrees, and dismisses the case 
when plaintiff refuses to join the indispensible 
party. 
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11. Plaintiff appeals the trial court ruling, and in 
January of 1986 the Supreme Court reverses the trial 
court, holding that the contractor is not an indispen-
sible party. 
12. September 1986 - 8 months after the Supreme Court 
decision is handed down, plaintiff requests a new 
trial setting. 
13. September 1986 - defendant files its second motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute (R. 411). The motion 
is denied in a ruling filed in December 1986 (R. 426). 
In denying the motion, the court ignored the case 
history prior to the 1986 Supreme Court decision, 
stating that its decision was based only on the 8 
month interval between the Supreme Court decision and 
plaintiff's request for a new trial setting. Based on 
that, the trial court felt that defendant was not 
prejudiced and to dismiss would result in an injustice 
to the plaintiff. 
As is evident from the above chronology, the plaintiff is 
responsible for a substantial number of the delays in this case. 
It is the plaintiff who brought the action and therefore had a 
duty to act, moving the case along. Yet, time after time, 
plaintiff allowed months and years to pass by without action. 
An award of prejudgment interest in this case would work an 
injustice against defendant and would reward plaintiff for 
failing to perform its affirmative duty. This would foster 
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delays in other cases, further burdening the courts in the hopes 
of obtaining large prejudgment interest awards. Plaintiff's 
conduct in this case precludes such an award for prejudgment 
interest. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO TIMELY 
FILE A BILL OF COSTS, IT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER THE COST OF TRANSCRIPTS. 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to recover the cost of 
trial transcripts which it used in preparation for its appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court. That appeal was decided in favor of the 
plaintiff on January 9, 1986. (See Plaintiff's Brief, page 18.) 
Rule 34(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
When costs are awarded to a party in an 
appeal from a lower court, a party claiming 
costs shall, within 15 days after the 
remittitur is filed with the clerk of the 
court below, serve upon the adverse party 
and file with the clerk of the court an 
itemized and verified bill of costs. 
Following the decision of the Utah Supreme Court mentioned 
above, a remittitur was filed on January 29, 1986 (R. 400). 
Plaintiff failed to file with the Clerk of the Court an itemized 
and verified bill of costs within 15 days of that date. In 
fact, plaintiff did not file a bill of costs until following the 
second trial, on June 12, 1987 (R. 673). 
Because of plaintiff's failure to follow Rule 34(d) and 
file its bill of costs in a timely manner, it is not entitled to 
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the cost of trial transcripts used in preparation for its 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly disallowed an award of prejudg-
ment interest and the cost of trial transcripts used in plain-
tiff's appeal. The trial court's decision, with respect to 
those two issues, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 1988. 
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